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Abstract 
EU member states frequently disagree over the management of financial crises, both regionally in the 
Eurozone and globally in the G20 despite decades of European integration, institution-building, and 
commitments to joint action. Mainstream integration theories of neofunctional institutionalism and 
liberal intergovernmentalism cannot sufficiently explain this puzzle of persistent European policy 
divergence on financial governance. I argue that the policy divergences can only be understood by 
analysing the societal foundations of governmental positions with the societal approach to 
governmental preference formation. The societal approach focusses on domestic societal ideas and 
material interests as explanatory variables for governmental positions. Regarding European policy 
divergence, I argue that both the coordination problems in the Eurozone and the European policy 
divergence in the G20 reflect the heterogeneity of domestic societal influences on member state 
governments. These arguments are empirically evidenced in case studies on the management of the 
Eurozone crisis and on Europe’s role in the governance of the global financial crisis in the G20. 
Keywords 
EU member states, financial governance, Eurozone crisis, G20, societal approach, domestic politics, 
ideas, interests, integration theory 
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The puzzle1 
EU member states frequently disagree over the management of financial crises, both regionally in the 
Eurozone and globally in the G20 despite decades of European integration, institution-building, and 
commitments to joint action. Regarding the management of the Eurocrisis, countries such as Germany, 
the Netherlands, and Finland favour fiscal restraint, seek strict conditions for financial help to crisis-
ridden members and reject Eurobonds. In contrast, debtor countries such as Italy, Greece, and Portugal 
favour loose fiscal policies, lax conditions for financial aid as well as a communitarisation of debt 
through Eurobonds (see case 1). These divergences rest on structural differences in competitiveness 
and solvency, but also point to ideational differences regarding the role of politics in steering the 
economy either through deficit spending or sound fiscal policies. Regarding the G20, European 
member states diverge over whether to reduce or augment public debt to stimulate growth, on the 
governance of global imbalances as well as over financial market regulation (see case 2). These issues 
also seem to express both differences in material interests, such as competitiveness and solvency, as 
well as ideational divergences regarding governmental regulation and intervention in markets. The 
frequent and numerous divergences seem puzzling in light of decade-long European integration and 
commitments for joint action. Why is financial governance often marked by policy divergence among 
European countries at the regional and global levels?  
Both major integration theories, neofunctionalist institutionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, 
show shortcomings in explaining the controversial governmental positions of EU members towards 
financial governance. Neofunctionalist institutionalism can explain the creation of new institutions 
(such as the ESM), but encounters difficulties in explaining policy divergence among member states. 
This is because it focuses on functional spillovers leading to common institutions, which for their part 
produce convergent expectations and behavior among member states rather than persistent divergence 
in face of common agreements and challenges (Niemann/Ioannou 2015; Verdun 2015). Liberal 
intergovernmentalism offers only a partial explanation for policy divergence, since it suggests that 
interdependencies among nations lead interest groups to demand further integration which is then 
achieved in grand bargains between governments (Moravcsik 1993; Schimmelfennig 2015). Thus, 
both theories make important contributions to the understanding of European integration, but cannot 
sufficiently explain the continuous and frequent policy divergence among European states in crisis 
management within the Eurozone and the G20.  
This paper argues that European policy divergence in financial governance can only be explained 
by analysing the societal foundations of governmental preference formation. For this endeavor, both 
domestic material interests and societal ideas matter since both lobby groups pursuing sectoral 
interests and value-based collective ideational expectations of voters may influence governmental 
positions. Resting on the assumption that governments wish to remain in office, the societal approach 
to governmental preference formation argues that interests and/or ideas inform governmental positions 
prior to the international context and to inter-state negotiations on the regional and global levels 
(Schirm 2014). Thus, the core hypothesis of this paper is that European policy divergence on financial 
governance correlates with differences in sectoral interests and/or societal ideas in the domestic 
politics of EMU countries and European members in the G20. Regarding the explanatory power of 
neofunctional institutuionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, the paper argues that their focus 
needs to be complemented by the societal approach in explaining the policy orientation of 
governmental preferences. In other words, the question on whether functional spillovers and common 
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institutions, on one hand, or interdependence-induced demand for cooperation and intergovernmental 
bargains, on the other, indeed lead to policy convergence and joint action crucially depends on the 
convergence or divergence of domestic ideas and/or interests in cross-country comparison. Hence, the 
societal approach complements major integration theories by providing a theoretical approach which 
considers the societal foundations and domestic politics of governmental preference formation. 
In sum, the goal of the paper is twofold: First, the empirical puzzle of persistent European policy 
divergence in financial governance despite common institutions, integration and commitments to joint 
action shall be explained. Second, the explanatory value and complementary relevance of the societal 
approach to governmental preference formation shall be made plausible. Given the theoretical and 
empirical innovation attempted here and the broad scope of the papers’ empirical cases, this study is 
preliminary and exemplary in nature. 
The paper proceeds in four steps. First, the societal approach to governmental preference formation 
will be presented, its variables defined, and hypotheses developed. Second, the case study on 
European policy divergence in the management of the Eurozone crisis examines whether the different 
positions of member governments correspond to domestic ideas and/or interests in cross-country 
comparison. Third, the case study on policy divergence in the G20 analyses whether the differing 
positions of European member states correlate with domestic ideas and/or interests relating to the 
issues debated in the G20. Both cases provide exemplary evidence for a correlation between the 
independent (societal ideas and interests) and the dependent (policy divergence) variables. Fourth, the 
conclusion compares the two case studies and aggregates the empirical as well as theoretical results of 
the study. Thus, the paper serves as a first approximation for the relevance of the societal approach in 
explaining European policy divergence in regional and global governance. 
The societal approach to governmental preference formation 
The societal approach developed in previous works (Schirm 2009; 2011; 2013; 2014) rests on theories 
of domestic politics such as the liberal theory of IR (Moravcsik 1997; Katzenstein 1978; Milner 1997) 
and varieties of capitalism theory (Hall/Soskice 2001; Fioretos 2001). The societal approach has both 
partially integrated and developed these theories further and focusses on the conditions for the 
prevalence of either societal ideas or interests in shaping governmental positions. 
The core assumption of the societal approach is that governments wish to remain in office and 
therefore tend to be responsive towards societal demands in democratic political systems. These 
societal influences on governmental preference formation can be found in societal interests and/or 
ideas. Interests are conceived here as sectoral material considerations whose cost-benefit calculations 
can change rapidly according to changing economic circumstances such as economic crises, 
competitiveness, and new global, regional as well as national economic regulations. Ideas are defined 
as value-based collective societal expectations about appropriate governmental positions and 
behaviour. Societal ideas and interests interact with one another and can mutually constitute each 
other. Their analytical separation here serves the purpose of identifying sui generis characteristics of 
the two variables. In its complete version, the societal approach also includes domestic institutions as 
an independent variable for the explanation of governmental preferences as the dependent variable 
(Schirm 2014). Domestic institutions, however, will not be considered in this paper, since societal 
ideas and interests seem better suited to explain European policy divergence in financial governance as 
observed at the beginning of the paper in the description of the analytical puzzle.  
Ideas and interests can reinforce each other, but they can also differ and compete in shaping 
governmental positions. This raises the question on the conditions for the prevalence of either ideas or 
interests. According to the societal approach, ideas will prevail in shaping governmental positions, if 
the issue at stake does not directly affect specific sectoral cost-benefit calculations, but instead 
involves fundamental questions on the role of politics in steering the economy (Schirm 2014). 
Societal Foundations of European Policy Divergence in Financial Governance 
3 
Conversely, interests will predominantly influence governmental positions, if the issue at stake 
directly implies cost-benefit calculations for a specific and well-organized economic sector (Schirm 
2014). Furthermore, the societal approach argues that the government’s ability to compromise in 
intergovernmental negotiations tends to be higher, if divergences are material (interest driven) in 
nature, than if they are shaped by contrasting value-based expectations (idea driven) (Schirm 2009: 
505). 
In sum, the societal theory offers an explanatory approach for the underlying reasons, that is, the 
societal foundations, of persistent divergence among European governmental positions towards 
financial governance. It complements the major integration theories of neofunctional institutionalism 
and liberal intergovernmentalism by suggesting domestic-level explanatory variables for the policy-
contents of these divergences. A domestic politics approach to European policy divergence also seems 
promissing because “domestic and European politics have become more tightly coupled as 
governments have become responsive to public pressures on European integration“ (Hooghe/Marks 
2008: 2). In addition, a domestic politics approach to governmental preference formation seems 
especially appropriate for the analysis of financial governance, because of the domestic impact of the 
crises and the essentially intergovernmental management attempts vis-a-vis the regional and global 
financial crises. Helleiner (2014: 2) underlines this point by stressing the need to examine the 
“enduring state-centric foundations of financial governance in contrast to analyses that focus more on 
the growing significance of international institutions or of transnational elites and ideologies”. 
Operationalization of the societal approach. In order to examine the relevance of the two domestic 
variables for governmental positions vis-à-vis the management of the Eurozone crisis and global 
finance, the potentially relevant ideational and interest-related indicators have to be identified. If 
governmental positions correspond to these indicators on ideas and interests, and if they diverge in 
cross-country comparison, then a plausible domestic politics explanation of policy divergence among 
EU members might be offered. In addition, the possible empirical identification of a prevalence of 
ideas or interests in shaping governmental positions allows for an assessment of the chances of future 
intergovernmental agreements. This is because a divergence in interests seems more accessible to 
compromise via a partition of costs than do ideational differences, which require a new consensus on 
societal expectations.  
Regarding ideas, it seems plausible to investigate ideas as attitudes towards the fundamental role of 
politics in steering the economy. Here, ideas with possible relevance for the governmental preference 
formation towards Eurozone and global financial governance might be found in attitudes towards 
sound versus loose fiscal policy and governmental debt. These attitudes can be evidenced through 
public opinion data, for example, of the Eurobarometer.  
Regarding interests, evidence with possible relevance for governmental positions might be found in 
statements of business associations on their expectations vis-à-vis the rules and management of the 
Eurozone crisis and global finance. In addition, data on economic competitiveness can indicate 
structural interests as well. 
Two disclaimers apply to the following case study analysis of societal ideas and interests. First, 
given the length restrictions for this paper, the evidence in the following sections can only be 
exemplary in nature. A comprehensive test of the argument of this paper is not intended and will need 
further research. Second, the focus on societal ideas and interests does not imply that other variables 
might not have influenced the divergence of governmental positions on the Euro area rules and on 
global financial governance in the G20. Rather, the argument brought forward here is that 
governmental positions and policy divergence cannot be understood without analysing the relevance 
of societal influences. 
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Case study selection 
The analysis of cases on both regional integration and global governance in comparative case studies 
is unconventional, since the European and the global policy levels are usually examined individually. 
Analysing the two levels together, however, seems promising since it overcomes the reductionist 
exclusively regional perspective which treats European integration as if it were singular in terms of 
intergovernmental cooperation in finance. In addition, comparing the positions of EU members on the 
regional and the global levels can exemplify the bearing of the societal variables with more 
plausibility, if the same variables matter on both levels. Furthermore, it can be shown that 
governmental preferences originate primarily in domestic politics and not primarily from the 
respective international, regional, or intergovernmental context. Thus, analysing regional and global 
finance in conjunction is a test for the societal approach because, if domestic politics really matters 
prior to the intergovernmental context, than similar ideas and/or interests must be detected at both 
policy levels. 
Regarding Eurozone country selection, the paper focusses on three crisis-ridden debtor countries 
(Spain, Italy, and Greece), a solvent major donor country (Germany), and a donor country with severe 
competitiveness problems (France). These countries serve as exemplary cases for policy divergence 
and (possibly) diverging societal ideas and interests. Regarding the G20, all four European member 
countries, namely, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom (UK), will be analysed.  
Regarding the two independent variables, the selected cases lead to the expectation that ideas and 
interests might matter to different degrees in shaping governmental positions. In the Eurozone case, 
both ideas and interests are expected to matter since it involves fundamental questions on the role of 
politics in steering the economy (ideas) as well as material cost-benefit considerations of economic 
sectors (interests). In the G20 cases, the debate on public debt focusses on the role of politics in 
steering the economy (ideas), while the controversies over global imbalances directly imply cost-
benefit considerations for the export sector or for firms threatened by imports (interests). Thus, the 
case selection offers variation regarding the possible bearing of ideas and/or interests on governmental 
positions.  
Case 1: Societal foundations of policy divergence in the Eurozone crisis 
The sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area erupted in early 2010 with the near default of Greece and 
has dominated policy making in the EU ever since. As of today, huge rescue packages, numerous 
intergovernmental negotiations, new institutions such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
new rules of conduct such as the revised Stability and Growth Pact, the sovereign bond buying 
programs by the European Central Bank (ECB) as well as reforms in the heavily indebted countries 
have all not solved the crisis.  
The governance of the Eurozone crisis has been markedly controversial from the outset and 
remains so today. While the Southern crisis-countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy) continue to need 
external help in order to manage their sovereign debt, solvency, bank rescue and lack of 
competitiveness, Northern countries (Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Finland) demonstrate lower debt 
levels, fiscal restraint, no solvency problems, higher competitiveness and a successful export 
performance. While the latter want their huge financial transfers to the South to be linked to strict 
conditions on economic policy, the Southern recipients favour lax conditions for transfers and a 
communitarisation of the debt burden through Eurobonds and a banking union. The two major drivers 
for European integration positioned themselves on differing sides with France advocating a policy 
discretionary approach and Germany a rule based approach to fiscal policy (Schild 2013: 36). Why has 
crisis management been harshly controversial in the last years? Specifically, why have policy 
harmonisation and common rules - which are perceived as necessary for a successful monetary union - 
been so difficult to achieve? 
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Research on the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis has focussed largely on four topics: First, 
intergovernmental bargains have been examined juxtaposing the different negotiating positions. 
Northern countries insisted on offering guarantees and transfers to the South only under strict 
conditions for reforms in crisis countries, for example, regarding the large rescue packages for Greece 
totalling 246 billion Euro (The Economist 10.8.2013: 53). Furthermore, the Northern Euro members 
led by Germany favoured fiscal restraint as a recipe for growth, national responsibility for economic 
policy, and a complete economic union as a precondition for Eurobonds which would communitarise 
credit-worthiness (The Economist Special Report on Germany 15.6.2013: 10). In contrast, many 
Southern Euro members favoured debt-fuelled demand, national autonomy regarding reforms, lax 
conditionality for aid, and the immediate creation of Eurobonds. 
The second strand of research has examined whether crisis management was able to appease ‘the 
markets’ (Schmidt 2013) which were heavily speculating on the default of crisis-ridden member 
countries, thus bringing their market interest rates to pre-Euro levels now seen as unsustainable. This 
strand of research pointed at the perceived primary need to calm financial markets and lower interest 
rates for Southern countries and criticised German hesitation and the long negotiations over the 
conditions for transfers. Bond-buying activities of the ECB were seen as stabilising the Euro area. 
Questions on the need to pressure crisis countries to undertake reforms, on democratic accountability 
and effects for the real economy were not in the focus of the ,appease financial markets’-literature.  
The third group of researchers focussed on the ‘national’ interests of the Euro member countries 
and especially on Germany’s interests, as Germany was held to be the key player in solving the crisis 
due to its economic strength (comprising around 27% of Eurozone GDP). This strand of research often 
also debated whether Northern or Southern countries were the main beneficiaries of the Euro through 
trade and capital flows until 2010 (Bibow 2013; Young/Semmler 2011). While some authors attribute 
Germany’s high export performance to imports from Southern Eurozone countries, others point to the 
trade data showing that German exports mainly go to Northern EU countries plus France and 
especially grew vis-à-vis emerging markets and the US. Southern Euro countries would mainly have 
benefitted by importing Northern credit-worthiness through the Euro, which allowed them to borrow 
for interest rates of 2-5 percent instead of 8-12 percent as they had before joining the Eurozone in the 
1990s. With these much lower interest rates, Southern countries enjoyed unsustainable consumption 
(Greece, Italy) and a real estate boom (Spain), causing solvency problems and ultimately leading to 
the crisis (Busch 2010; Lane 2012: 53). Banks from the US, the UK, France and Germany lend heavily 
to Southern Euro members and are now the main beneficiaries from the rescue packages (Hall 2012: 
364). The involvement of US banks explains the forceful demands of the US government for rescue 
payments and Eurobonds. 
The fourth area of research concentrates on the design faults of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) from its inception in the Maastricht Treaty 1992 to the current crisis management (De Grauwe 
2013; Lane 2012). Deficiencies are detected in the creation of a common currency without a political 
union, including common economic, fiscal and financial policy making, and without a lender of last 
resort. The parallel authority of sovereign nation states for their economic and fiscal policies, on the 
one hand, and the unified monetary policy under the ECB’s control, on the other hand, would be 
unfeasible. 
While these four strands of research on the Euro crisis clarify many issues, they fail to properly 
address the causes of the divergence of national economic policies, which decisively contributed to the 
crisis itself and to its controversial management since 2010. Specifically, with few exceptions (such as 
Hall 2012 and Höpner/Schäfer 2012 on domestic institutions; Olender 2012) research has widely 
ignored the domestic foundations of economic policy making and of governmental preference 
formation vis-à-vis intergovernmental negotiations. Differences in domestic ideas and interests, 
however, present an obstacle to any legitimate and efficient European regulation, since regulations 
must be accepted and implemented in all member states if the EMU is to achieve a sustainable 
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common basis. This gap in research will be addressed in the following case studies by using the 
societal approach to governmental preference formation. 
Ideas in the political economy of the Eurozone crisis 
Following the societal approach, if policy divergence on the Euro rules and crisis management are 
influenced by societal ideas, these have to refer to the fundamental role of politics in steering the 
economy, especially in the fields of fiscal and monetary policies. Policy divergence on the Euro level 
focussed primarily on fiscal restraint versus debt-financed policies. Therefore, potentially relevant 
societal expectations about appropriate governmental positions can plausibly be found in public 
attitudes towards more/less government debt and monetary stability (inflation). The following 
exemplary numbers from the Eurobarometer (2013) serve as preliminary evidence for societal ideas as 
attitudes: 
 
Public attitudes towards public debt and inflation in Europe 
 
Government debt as important issue facing 
your country 
Inflation as important issue facing your 
country 
Germany 23 % 25 % 
Greece 15 % 7 % 
France 13 % 15 % 
Italy 11 % 22 % 
Spain 7 % 9 % 
 
EU Commission 2013: Public Opinion in the European Union, Standard Eurobarometer 80, Autumn 2013, Brussels, p. 12. 
These numbers evidence societal attitudes corresponding to the respective governmental positions vis-
a-vis financial governance in the Eurozone crisis. Even though Germany did not have any problems 
with its solvency and government debt, Germans were considerably more preoccupied with 
governmental debt than the voters in the other countries, whose governments showed much higher 
levels of debt and severe problems in serving their debt burden. Thus, the insistence of the German 
government in the Eurozone negotiations on reducing public debt and the laxer positions assumed by 
the governments of the other countries vis-a-vis public debt reflect more domestic societal attitudes 
than the actual debt levels and the ability of a country to service its debt. Similarly, German insistence 
on monetary stability (low inflation) and the more relaxed positions of the other countries’ 
governments on this issue also correspond to the considerably higher importance Germans attribute to 
this challenge compared to the attitudes in the other countries under scrutiny here.  
The following exemplary quotes underline the positions of the respective governments: 
Germany: Chancellor Merkel was quoted in the Financial Times defending the Eurozone’s fiscal 
rules prioritizing low governmental debt and monetary stability, stressing that ‘All member states must 
accept in full the strengthened rules‘ (Wagstyl/Politi 2014). The Economist‘s Special Report on 
Germany (p. 10) concludes ‘Mrs Merkel has no truck with Keynesian deficit spending, and her 
government stands firm against Eurobonds‘.  
France: President Francois Hollande ‘demanded that Brussels allow them more budget flexibility’ 
(quoted from the FT, in: Wagstyl/Politi 2014). The Irish Times comments: ‘Germany and France in 
Societal Foundations of European Policy Divergence in Financial Governance 
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austerity vs stimulus stand-off: The French-led camp were as heartened as the German camp was 
frustrated with the ECB president Mario Draghi’s apparent call in the US for EU leaders to boost 
growth by emphasizing fiscal stimulus over austerity’ (Scally 2014). 
Italy: Prime Minister Matteo Renzi ‘proposes big tax cuts’ (meaning raising debt) (BBC 2014) and 
says EU stability pact is ‘stupid’: ‘Renzi (…) made clear that he would like to be able to ignore the 
three percent ceiling and spend his way out of the long and severe recession Italy has only just edged 
out of’ (The Local 2014). In addition, Renzi declared that ‘Europe needs to be capable of an economic 
response that invests in growth and not just rigour and austerity’ (quoted from the FT, in: 
Wagstyl/Politi 2014) 
Spain: Like the Italian and the Greek governments, the Spanish government was caught in between 
the conditions of the EU/Troika, including budgetary restraint and reforms, for obtaining financial 
help on the one hand, and the opposition of many voters to these conditions on the other. The Spanish 
government followed the conditions more than the Greek and Italian governments did, but could also 
not refrain from increasing debt through new stimulus: ‘Spain‘s Rajoy adds some stimulus to 
austerity’ (Morris/Ortiz 2013). The Economist (2.3.2012) comments ‘Rajoy loosens his belt (...) 
Spain's Mariano Rajoy has rebelled against this year's European Union-agreed objective’. 
Greece: The several Greek governments in power since the first bail-out rescue programme for 
their country in 2010 undertook reforms and budget consolidation to a lesser degree than Spain and 
largely focussed on cuts in social systems. However, they did not enact privatisations and taxes for the 
rich. Positions oscillated between blaming the Troika conditions for the country’s problems and 
appeasing the Troika to continue receiving financial help (The Economist 11.12.2014). Ultimately, 
many Greek voters were unsatisfied with the modest reforms and budget cuts of previous governments 
and voted for Syriza in 2015, a party which rejects the Troika conditions for transfer payments (The 
Economist 2015).  
Summing up, the evidence shows that the dependent variable, governmental positions in the Euro 
crisis, corresponds to the independent variable, societal ideas as attitudes. The insistence of the 
German government on fiscal restraint in crisis countries and the much lesser priority on this issue in 
the other countries are both consistent with the different priority attributed to government debt and to 
inflation by the respective societies in cross-country comparison.  
Interests in the political economy of the Eurozone crisis 
If policy divergence on the Euro regulations and the management of the Euro debt crisis is informed 
by domestic interests, then material cost-benefit calculations of specific interest groups must be found 
that demand corresponding positions from their national governments. In the following, statements by 
national industry federations and chambers of commerce in the countries under scrutiny will be 
presented as exemplary evidence for well-organised and politically relevant lobby groups. Other 
interest groups may, of course, also have influenced governmental preference formation. Industry 
associations and chambers of commerce, however, can be considered as the most important regarding 
diverging demands to national governments since their members’ cost-benefit calculations are directly 
affected in different ways by Euro regulations and because their members represent a large segment of 
private economic interests. The financial industry, represented by banking associations, is also an 
important player in the Euro crisis. However, its interest in making the public pay for bail-outs and in 
the appeasement of financial markets, can be held as constant in all the countries and can therefore not 
explain policy divergence.  
German interest groups. The presidents of the Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag 
(DIHK), Hans Heinrich Driftmann and of the Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks (ZDH), Otto 
Kentzler, issued a joint statement on their organisations’ demands regarding the management of the 
Eurozone crisis in 2011, stressing that neither an ‘exit of members’ nor ‘unrestricted solidarity’ should 
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be seen as viable. Rather, the following points should be considered as core requirements for a ‘new 
start of the Monetary Union’: Solidarity with crisis countries must be accompanied by strict conditions 
and control for financial aid; sound budgetary policies must lead to growth through savings; 
Eurobonds are not an option given the lack of integration in economic and financial policies; the 
credibility of solid national fiscal policies has to be anchored by debt-brakes in national constitutions; 
the ECB should only buy national debt in times of emergency; rules-based insolvency of EMU 
countries should be made possible in order to increase early pressures for consolidation of public debt 
(Driftmann/Kentzler 2011). With these demands, two of the most important representatives of German 
industry formulated what can been observed as the German government’s policy positions vis-à-vis 
the Euro crisis: the reasons for the crisis are seen in unsustainable debt in crisis countries; financial aid 
will only be provided if accompanied by strict conditions for sound budgetary policies; and Eurobonds 
are not considered an option as long as national fiscal policies are not integrated.  
French interest groups. The president of the French Mouvement des Enterprises de France 
(MEDEF), Pierre Gattaz, demanded from the French government that state expenditure be drastically 
cut and conditions for competitiveness improved vis-a-vis its neighbours (Gattaz 2014). Furthermore, 
in a joint declaration with the Federation of German Industry (BDI), MEDEF underlines the need to 
fully implement EMU’s growth and stability pact, to reduce public debt, to secure budgetary 
discipline, and to reform national economies. Both organisations stress the need for ‘maintaining a 
consistent balance between member states’ own consolidation and reform efforts and, in direct 
association with them, joint solidarity mechanisms which are clearly defined in terms of scope and 
duration’ (BDI/MEDEF 2013). Thus, the major French and German business associations agree on 
‘clearly defined’ (that is, strict) conditionality for transfer payments, which must be linked to national 
reforms and to a substantial reduction of public debt in order to strengthen the EMU.  
Spanish interest groups. The president of the most important Spanish industry federation, the 
Confederacion Espanola de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE), Juan Rosell, wrote in a 
contribution to the daily El Pais that Spain must engage in structural reforms of the labour market 
similar to those undertaken in Germany under Chancellor Schröder (Agenda 2010) in order to 
‘strengthen the mobility of labour’ and ‘reduce competitive disequilibrium’. Additionally, he demands 
a ‘fiscal and banking union’ in the EMU (Rosell 2012). In another article by El Pais, Rosell is quoted 
asking for more time to be given to Spain for its economic adjustment and reforms (Gonzales 2012). 
Thus, the requests of the president of Spain’s major business association correspond to the strategy of 
the country’s government in pushing through structural reforms in order to increase competitiveness 
and balance the budget on one side and demand more time for reforms and a fiscal and banking union 
in the EMU on the other. The latter would imply a communitarisation of debt and risk in the EMU and 
is therefore opposed by solvent countries and their interests groups, including Germany, Austria, and 
the Netherlands. 
Italian interest groups. The president of Italy’s most important industrialist association 
CONFINDUSTRIA, Emma Marcegaglia, stated in her report to the association’s assembly in 2010 on 
the Euro crisis that ‘Greece’s public debt crisis has contaminated the entire Eurozone (...) For years, 
Greece has been living beyond its means and hiding the real state of its public accounts. (...) It was a 
good thing that the autonomy and independence of the ECB, in the way it acquires government bonds, 
were preserved. (...) it has now become clear, we need to strengthen our collective means for ensuring 
budget discipline. National budget policies and structural reforms must really become more like shared 
issues: to fight discrepancies in productivity and create a truly integrated economic area’ (Marcegaglia 
2010). Thus, in 2010, the president of CONFINDUSTRIA had already stressed public debt and low 
competitiveness as major sources for the Euro crisis and demanded reforms from their own and other 
governments, for example, reforming the labour market and implementing sound budgetary policies, 
to address these issues. These reforms were enacted most decisively by the Monti government in 
2011-13. In line with her Spanish counterpart, but in opposition to Germany’s industry representatives, 
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Marcegaglia asked the ECB to continue to buy bonds from crisis-ridden countries in order to prevent 
market-driven interest rates for Italy. 
Greek interest groups. The chairman of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEV), Dimitris 
Daskalopoulos, stressed in his speech before the SEV assembly in 2013 that Greece would have ‘two 
millstones round its neck: the anti-growth memorandums and the anachronistic state’. Besides 
criticising the inefficient and ‘clientele’-dominated character of the Greek state, the SEV-President 
complained about the conditions (‘memorandums’) which the Troika of the EU, ECB, and the IMF 
demanded in return for the vast bail-out loans and guarantees necessary to help Greece stay solvent. 
While praising the ‘great and successful efforts the current government and prime minister, personally, 
is making’, Daskalopoulos demanded changes in the conditions (budgetary restraint, higher taxes etc.) 
for financial aid, which would then allow for a ‘National Development Program’ consisting of 
alleviations for banks, lower taxes and energy costs, and an industrial policy. Thus, one of the most 
important representatives of Greek business demanded an easing of conditions for external help 
(‘relaxed fiscal stance’) and an introduction of state-led growth strategies, such as industrial policy. 
The latter would imply rising public expenditures and new problems in competitiveness and debt-
repayment. These positions correspond to the Greek government’s resistance to and only partial 
fulfilment of the conditions for its financial rescue. Greece did not comply, for example, with the 
condition to privatise parts of its large, state-controlled economic sector, to liberalize corporatist 
regulations and to raise taxes on the wealthy. 
In comparison, the domestic interest group associations in the five countries expressed different 
demands vis-à-vis their governments, all of which reflected their respective competitive position and 
cost-benefit calculations. The German DIHK and ZDH Presidents were the most explicit in their 
organisation’s positions towards the conditions- and self-responsibility-driven management of the 
Eurozone crisis. The French MEDEF emphasised the need to restrict budget deficits, to enhance 
competitive conditions for French business, and to link transfer payments for crisis-ridden countries to 
reforms in these countries. The Spanish CEOE President focussed in its statements on the need for 
domestic structural reforms (specially of the labour market) and asked for largely unconditional 
transfers to Spain through a fiscal and banking union. The Italian President of CONFINDUSTRIA 
emphasised the need for sound fiscal policies in the Euro area and for national reforms in Italy, but 
also demanded transfers from other Euro countries through ECB bond buying programmes and the 
creation of a fiscal and banking union. Finally, the Greek President of SEV criticised both the 
inefficient Greek state and the Troika-conditions for external financial aid to his country, demanding a 
change towards lax fiscal policies and state intervention e.g. through industrial policy. Thus, while the 
first four countries’ business representatives approved of sound fiscal policies, but differed on 
unconditional transfers and a fiscal/banking union (which would cost Germany and France, while 
benefitting Spain and Italy), the Greek business representative’s preferences diverged on most points 
from those of his counterparts.  
In cross-country comparison, the different interests articulated by industry associations on 
budgetary policies corresponded fully with their respective governments’ positions in the case of 
Germany and, for the most part in Italy, Spain and Greece as well. The latter three governments, 
however, were forced formally (Spain, Greece) and informally (Italy) to cut budgetary deficits in order 
to receive external help from solvent Eurozone members, the ESM, the IMF, and the ECB, but 
demanded laxer conditions on this issue and more external help through Eurobonds. It is interesting to 
note that while the industry associations’ differing positions on budget deficits were roughly in line 
with their respective governments’ positions in Germany, Spain, Italy, and Greece, the French 
MEDEF was the only association whose position was critical towards its government on this crucial 
issue. A plausible explanation for this variation can be found in the relatively smaller relevance of 
French industry for its economy in cross-country comparison. French industry’s contribution to total 
GNP (12.5%) is only half of the German industry’s contribution (25.8%), with the contributions of 
Italian and Spanish industry falling in between (Eurostat numbers in: Statistisches Bundesamt 2013). 
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Thus, the relative importance of an interest group for the respective economy seems to contribute to its 
influence on governmental positions.  
Case 2: Societal foundations of European policy divergence in the G20 
For European policy divergence in the G20 to be shaped by societal influences and thus explainable 
with the societal approach, governmental positions in the G20 must correspond to ideas and/or 
interests prevalent in the domestic politics of countries. Therefore, this section of the paper will 
delineate the positions of the European G20 members on core issues of G20 debates and investigate 
possibly relevant societal foundations for these positions. The four European G20 members are 
France, Germany, Italy and the UK. The issues to be examined here are (1) the debate on public debt 
and economic stimulus packages, and (2) the controversies over global imbalances. These two 
economic policy topics were at the core of G20 debates since 2010 and triggered strong controversies 
among G20 members. Hence, they seem especially interesting as case studies for the analysis of the 
policy divergence of European member countries. Did European member countries pursue a 
neofunctionalist-institutional logic in following the mutual commitments in the European Council to 
coordinate their positions in an ‘agreed language’ (Hodson 2011: 9; Wouters et.al 2010: 15) in the 
G20? Or did differing societal preferences correlate with governmental positions in the G20 
negotiations? 
Domestic ideas in the G20 debate on public debt and economic stimulus 
Prompted by the eruption of the global financial crisis, the G20 first gathered on the leaders’ 
level in 2008 and agreed to cushion the crisis-induced recessions with national economic 
stimulus programmes. These stimulus packages are largely held to have successfully 
prevented a further deterioration of the economic downturn and beggar-thy-neighbour policies 
in many countries (Schirm 2013: 695). Since the fading of the crisis in 2010, however, some 
G20 members, such as Germany, increasingly advocated ending stimulus programmes 
financed by deficit spending while other members, including the US and France, demanded 
deficit spending to be continued and expanded. While countries favouring fiscal restraint 
argue that deficit spending would be structurally unsustainable and could trigger inflationary 
pressures, G20 members favouring a continuation and expansion of deficit spending argue 
that fiscal restraint would endanger the prospects for recovery and growth. 
European G20 members have largely positioned themselves on differing sides of the debate. While 
Germany led the camp advocating an ‘exit’ to deficit spending, France, Italy, and the UK were in most 
instances in favour of continuing stimulus programmes.  
Germany: For example, Chancellor Merkel demanded before the G20 Seoul summit in 2010 that 
members ‘talk more in the G20 framework about the exit strategy from our various crisis programmes. 
We must switch to a phase of budget consolidation, as we are doing in Germany‘ (Merkel 2010). 
Already in 2009, the German Finance Minister Steinbrück (2009)had urged G20 members to seek an 
‘exit-strategy‘ from debt-fuelled big spending. 
Italy: Prime Minister Renzi made clear that job creation and growth, rather than austerity will be 
the focus of his government (BBC 2014). In 2011, Prime Minister Berlusconi ‘had been expected to 
come to the G20 summit in Cannes with a specific austerity package (...). But divisions within his 
cabinet meant he arrived empty-handed, frustrating other EU leaders concerned that the euro edifice 
could collapse’ (Wintour/Elliott 2011). 
France: Opposing Germany at G20 summit in St. Petersburg 2013, Presidents Hollande and 
Obama stressed that ‘budgetary orthodoxy must not destroy growth’ (Faujas/Le Monde 2014). Before 
Societal Foundations of European Policy Divergence in Financial Governance 
11 
the G20 summit in Los Cabos in 2012 Hollande pushed to do more to stimulate growth and not just 
focus on reducing deficits, while other G20 members such as Germany and Canada opposed this 
position. Canada‘s Prime Minister Stephen Harper argued ‘that tight budgets and healthy economic 
growth are both possible’ (Palmer/Reuters 2012). At the G20 finance ministers meeting in 2014 in 
Cairns, the policy divergence between European members continued: ‘France and Italy are pushing for 
fiscal stimulus while Germany is an advocate of budgetary restraint’ (Smyth 2014).  
United Kingdom: Prime Minister Gordon Brown stressed the need to keep economic stimulus in 
November 2009, saying ‘choking off recovery by turning off the life support prematurely would be 
fatal to world growth … (will) continue with our plans to support our economy until the private sector 
recovery is established’ (Brown 2009). Brown reaffirmed his position stating that ‘it would be suicidal 
to abandon economic stimulus’ (Hennessy 2009). Prime Minister David Cameron started his tenure 
refusing new fiscal stimulus for the UK, but eased his stance on this issue later on, for example, by 
enacting a stimulus programme for Northern Ireland, a new 140 bn Pound stimulus plan in 2012, and 
by tax cuts (The Guardian 2014). Within the G20, Cameron favoured continued stimulus: ‘Cameron 
calls on G20 leadership to spearhead economic growth stimulus’ (Chu 2011). 
These governmental positions towards the exit or prolongation of debt-fuelled stimulus 
programmes correspond to differences in ideational societal expectations in cross-country comparison: 
 
Public attitudes towards public debt and inflation in Europe 
 
Government debt as important issue 
facing your country 
Inflation as important issue facing 
your country 
Germany 23 % 25 % 
UK 14 % 18 % 
France 13 % 15 % 
Italy 11 % 22 % 
 
EU Commission 2013: Public Opinion in the European Union, Standard Eurobarometer 80, Autumn 2013, Brussels. 
These numbers on ideas as attitudes regarding appropriate policies offer preliminary evidence 
for different degrees of acceptance for public debt, and thus for stimulus programmes 
financed by deficit spending in European G20 member states. Regarding sectoral interests, the 
analysis maintains that material economic interests cannot explain the divergences of 
governmental positions. This is because economic actors in all countries would benefit from 
stimulus programmes. Furthermore, no single sector is specifically affected since stimulus 
programmes are distributed mainly in a diffuse way and not sectorally. Thus, variation in the 
dependent variable (governmental positions) cannot be explained by interests since this 
independent variable (material interests) does not offer variation. 
Overall, the case of public debt and stimulus apparently supports the societal approach’s hypothesis 
that ideas prevail in shaping governmental positions when fundamental questions of the role of politics 
in steering the economy are concerned and sectoral interests are affected in a diffuse manner. The 
heterogeneity of policies and positions was plausibly informed by the heterogeneity of domestic ideas. 
The Eurozone crisis and the G20 cases differ regarding their policy contents. While the G20 debate 
was about general public debt/stimulus, the negotiations on the Eurozone crisis involved budget 
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deficits, inflation, communitarisation of debt (Eurobonds), transfer payments to crisis-ridden countries 
and their conditions. Thus, while the Eurozone crisis affected interest groups directly, the G20 debates 
only diffusely. As a result, ideational divergences dominated the controversies in the G20 and no 
agreement was reached. As such, this finding additionally supports the societal approach’s hypothesis 
that intergovernmental compromise is more difficult to achieve in cases of ideational differences than 
in cases of diverging material interests. 
Domestic interests and the G20 controversy on global imbalances 
Global imbalances became a core issue in the G20 debates in 2010 when US treasury secretary 
Timothy Geithner demanded a cap on trade surpluses and deficits which exceed 4 percent of GDP. 
With this initiative, Geithner was targeting the large export surpluses in China, Germany, Japan and 
Brazil in hopes of reducing the competitive pressure facing US industry. Geithners proposal was 
rejected by the surplus countries in the G20. 
The four European G20 members differed regarding global imbalances: while the German 
government strictly opposed caps for imbalances and identified the competitive problems of trade 
deficit countries as the main problem (see quotes), the French, the British, and the Italian governments 
supported the US proposal in stressing the need to reduce global imbalances via multilateral rules. 
Germany: German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble emphasised that ‘the German export 
successes are not the result of some sort of currency manipulation, but of the increased 
competitiveness of companies. It is the American growth model, on the other hand, which is in a deep 
crisis’ (Schäuble 2010). Chancellor Merkel defended the German export sector in the G20 debates by 
stating: ‘we have clearly paid attention that export surpluses as expression of good competitiveness 
must never be banned’ (Merkel 2011). 
France: President Sarkozy emphasised that ‘the International Monetary Fund’s mandate should be 
expanded to measure, monitor and enforce new rules on global economic imbalances’ (Sarkozy 2011). 
In 2014 President Hollande and the US Secretary of Finance Jack Lew stated that G20 must give full 
priority again this year to growth, employment and reducing global imbalances (Embassy of France 
2014). 
Italy: Giulio Tremonti, Minister of the Economy and Finance stated: ‘The steady increase in global 
imbalances threatens the sustainability of the global recovery and risks to exacerbate financial 
volatility’ (Tremonti 2011). Prime Minister Mario Monti was quoted in The Guardian in 2012: ‘In a 
sign of the tensions, the Italian prime minister, Mario Monti, said no one thought the EU was ‘the only 
source of the problem’. The crisis ‘had its origins in imbalances in other countries (...)’ (Wintour 
2012).  
UK: Prime Minister Brown demanded that the Group of 20 major economies should come up with 
a strategy to tackle global imbalances in trade (Reuters 2009). UK Chancellor of the Exchequer 
George Osborne urged ‘all countries to play their part in redressing the global imbalances’ and stated 
‘I would argue that the UK is playing its part dealing with its own imbalances and seeking to promote 
exports. Clearly, this is a role not just for the IMF but also for the G-20’ (quoted in Fingar 2010). 
Prime Minister Cameron initiated a letter to the French G20 presidency in 2011, asking for joint action 
against global imbalances (Chu 2011). 
Ultimately, Italy, the UK, and France supported the political regulation of imbalances, while the 
German government stressed the virtues of free trade and competitiveness. The positions of the 
governments involved in the debate on global imbalances correlated with the economic interests of 
crucial domestic sectors. While in Germany the export sector was directly affected by the (potential 
costs of) the new global economic governance initiative, in Italy, France, and the UK the interests 
affected were not concentrated in a specific sector, but involved the cost-benefit calculations of all 
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companies threatened by import competition and therefore had a direct interest in reducing the 
competitive pressure from imports.  
In the case of Germany, the export sector contributes roughly one-third of the GDP and possesses 
strong and well organised associations, primarily the German Chamber for Industry and Trade (DIHT) 
and the Association of German Industry (BDI). Both associations’ presidents warned against caps for 
exports. For example, the President of the German Chamber for Industry and Trade (DIHK), Hans 
Heinrich Driftmann (2010), warned that everyone would lose from new restrictions on trade and that 
‘the best solution for economies with weak exports is anyway to work on their competitiveness‘.  
In contrast to Germany, the French, Italian and British trade balances were either considerably 
negative (France, UK) or in some years negative, in others slightly positive (Italy). In the four years 
relevant for the G20 debate (2010-2013) France showed a negative yearly balance between -87 and -
123 billion Dollars, the UK between -153 and -170 billion Dollars, and Italy between -41 and +38 
billion Dollars, while Germany ran a surplus of between +205 and + 262 billion Dollars (OECD 
2015). These numbers indicate severe import pressure on French and British domestic industry and a 
mixed picture for Italian industry. For all three countries, the numbers imply a weak competitiveness 
of a large part of domestic industry, which would have benefitted from new global governance 
limiting exports from surplus countries such as Germany, China, and Japan. Since firms threatened by 
import competition are not organized in associations (contrary to the export sector), sectoral lobbying 
on caps for exports could not be detected in France, the UK, and Italy, while German exporters clearly 
stated their rejection of multilateral restrictions on exports. The positions of the French, Italian, and 
UK governments in the G20, however, corresponded to the competitive problems and thus to the 
economic interests of domestic firms.  
Overall, the case of global imbalances confirms the argument that governmental positions 
correspond to material interests, when global governance issues directly affect the cost-benefit 
calculations of economic sectors, in this case also of the non-organised firms threatened by import 
competition. European policy divergence was the result of the heterogeneity of domestic interests 
which inhibited the four governments from finding an ‘agreed language’ on the issue of global 
imbalances. In the end, the G20 did agree to monitor imbalances regarding trade, debt, savings and 
capital flows. Thus, a moderate compromise was found, supporting the societal approach’s hypothesis 
that intergovernmental agreements are easier to achieve if divergences are interest-related and not 
dominated by ideas as in the previous case. 
Conclusion 
The aims of this paper were twofold. First, it attempted to demonstrate the relevancy of the societal 
approach in explaining the domestic ideational and interest-related foundations of European 
governmental preferences towards multilateral and regional policy coordination. Second, it sought to 
explain the empirical puzzle regarding the reasons for the persistent policy divergence of European 
countries over the management of regional and global financial crises, despite commitments to joint 
action, common rules, and decades-long European integration. Thus, the paper is explorative in 
theoretically and empirically exemplifying how a domestic politics-oriented societal approach can 
contribute to the explanation of governmental preferences and European policy divergence. 
The findings in the case studies evidenced that divergent governmental positions towards financial 
governance in the Eurozone and the G20 strongly corresponded to different societal ideas and/or 
interests in cross-country comparison. Thus, a domestic politics approach to policy divergence proved 
crucial for explaining the puzzle and a necessary complement to mainstream integration theories. 
Governmental positions were consistent with societal ideas and/or interests. Supporting the hypotheses 
of the societal approach, the case studies evidenced that societal ideas shaped governmental positions, 
when the governance issue at stake referred to the role of politics in steering the economy and did not 
Stefan A. Schirm  
14 
(or only diffusely) affect economic interests. Conversely, governmental positions corresponded to 
economic interests when the governance issue directly affected the cost-benefit calculations of specific 
sectors or firms. These arguments were evidenced in the two case studies on European policy 
divergence in the Eurozone crisis and in the G20.  
In the case of the Eurozone crisis, societal ideas and interests largely reinforced each other, since 
the governance issues (transfer payments, conditions for aid, budget deficits, competitiveness) 
involved questions relating to both the fundamental role of politics in steering the economy and the 
cost-benefit calculations of economic sectors. In the first G20 case, societal ideas shaped 
governmental positions on stimulus and debt, since this issue related to the fundamental role of politics 
in steering the economy and only affected economic interests diffusely. Conversely, the second G20 
case on global imbalances directly affected the cost-benefit calculations of the export sector 
(Germany) and of firms suffering from competitive problems (France, Italy, UK), whose interests 
shaped the respective governmental positions. 
This paper‘s explorative claim was analysed in a preliminary and exemplary form. Future research 
will deepen the analysis though encompassing more country cases and a systematic test of the 
hypotheses with evidence from additional case studies. 
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